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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Corbello v. Iowa 
Production decision in 2003, litigation by landowners seeking 
compensation for alleged environmental damage to their property, 
commonly known as legacy litigation, increased dramatically, 
particularly in relation to oil and gas exploration and production 
sites.1 In response to Corbello, the Louisiana legislature enacted 
Act No. 312 (hereinafter “Act 312” or “the Act”) of the 2006 
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, primarily in an effort 
to ensure that contaminated oil and gas exploration sites were 
remediated to the extent necessary to protect the public interest. 
Part II of this article briefly addresses the historical background 
of legacy litigation, through and including Act 312. It will draw 
primarily upon my previous article, “Legacy Litigation” and Act 
312 of 2006, published in the Tulane Environmental Law Journal.2 
Part III of this article reviews certain major issues arising since the 
enactment of Act 312 and how courts have dealt with these issues. 
The issues addressed include the scope of damages, the need to 
remediate environmental damages, the extent of remediation 
required, and the proper timing of litigation.3 Finally, Part IV 
examines the battle to amend legacy litigation law in the 2012 
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature and analyzes the new 
laws as enacted. 
 
                                                                                                             
 1. 02-0826 (La. 2/25/03); 850 So. 2d 686.  
 2. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 347 (2007). 
 3. For example—whether suits are brought too early or too late, who has 
the right to sue, and constitutional issues. 
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II. FROM CORBELLO TO ACT 312 
Since the oil and gas industry entered Louisiana with the 
discovery of the Jennings Field in 1901, landowners have 
occasionally sued for alleged damage to their property.4 However, 
the nature and extent of such litigation changed drastically after the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa 
Production.5  
In Corbello, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that in a claim 
for breach of a contractual obligation to restore property, damages 
need not be “tethered” to the value of the property, thus allowing 
landowners to assert and receive damages that disregarded, and 
largely exceeded, the fair market worth of the property.6 Further, 
the court held that a landowner who collected such damages could 
not legally be required to remediate the offending contamination.7 
This decision created, or, at a minimum, highlighted, a scenario in 
which property was worth more polluted than not, and landowners 
could sue for and collect large amounts of damages yet leave the 
property in its allegedly polluted state. Predictably, Corbello 
resulted in increased attention to legacy litigation. Three years 
later, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act No. 312 of the 2006 
Regular Session as a direct response to Corbello and the similar 
lawsuits that followed.8  
Act 312’s provisions have been summarized as follows by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court: 
First, the act requires timely notice of such litigation to the 
State. Second, the act stays the litigation until thirty days 
after notice is given. Third, the act permits the State to 
intervene in the litigation. Fourth, the act provides a role for 
the Office of Conservation with the Louisiana Department 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Andrepont v. Acadian Drilling Co., 231 So. 2d 347 (La. 1969); see 
also Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1953); see also Rohner v. 
Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1958). 
 5. Corbello, 850 So. 2d 686. See generally Pitre, supra note 2. 
 6. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 693. 
 7. Id. at 701. 
 8. While Corbello gets most of the credit for the increased litigation 
activity, large judgments in other cases alleging contamination doubtlessly 
contributed to the rise in litigious activity. See, e.g., Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 
02-1237, p. 32–33 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/05); 901 So. 2d 1117, 1141–42 
(affirming a $56 million award of damages for remediation of property worth at 
most $1.5 million); Dore Energy, Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 04-1373, p. 7 
(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/05), 901 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (affirming that, under certain 
circumstances, a lawsuit could go forward while oil, gas, and mineral lease 
remained in effect). 
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of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) in the determination of the 
most feasible plan for evaluation and/or remediation of 
environmental damage. Fifth, the act provides for the 
payment of all damages for the evaluation or remediation 
of environmental damages and further provides that the 
Court shall oversee actual implementation of the plan 
adjudicated to be “most feasible.” Sixth, the act allows the 
landowner and the State to recover attorney and expert fees, 
as well as costs from the responsible party or parties.9  
In 2012, six years after the enactment of Act 312, the 
legislature amended it for the first time. The rest of this article 
reviews certain major developments under Act 312 since 2006, 
including the new legislation enacted this year. 
III. FROM ACT 312 TO 2012 
Since Act 312’s enactment, cases subject to the Act have been 
addressed in Louisiana courts at every level. In deciding these 
cases, the courts have addressed the procedural aspects of Act 312, 
as well as legal issues not directly related to the Act. 
A. Issues Addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court 
Over the last few years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
issued several decisions addressing issues relevant to Act 312 and 
legacy litigation. Importantly, the Court determined that Act 312 
was constitutional in its 2008 M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp. decision.10 Other issues addressed by the Court include 
whether pre-suit notice is required,11 when an action has 
prescribed,12 and whether a subsequent landowner can sue for 
damages to property occurring prior to its acquisition of the 
property.13  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 9. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 29 (La. 7/1/08); 
998 So. 2d 16, 36 (citations omitted); see also Pitre, supra note 2, at 350–54 
(identifying the six major components of Act 312 and providing a more detailed 
discussion of the provisions of Act 312).  
 10. 998 So. 2d at 38. 
 11. Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-0449 (La. 10/20/09); 24 So. 3d 813. 
 12. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10) ; 45 So. 3d 991. 
 13. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267 (La. 
10/25/2011); 79 So. 3d 246. 
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1. Constitutionality—M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
In 2006, M.J. Farms, Ltd. filed suit against various oil and gas 
companies, alleging that the defendants caused environmental 
damage to its property.14 Specifically, M.J. Farms alleged that the 
defendants’ oil and gas exploration and production activities 
contaminated the surface, subsurface, ground waters, and 
subsurface aquifers.15 M.J. Farms sought damages under Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 31:22, a statute obliging the owner of a 
mineral servitude “insofar as practicable, to restore the surface to 
its original condition at the earliest reasonable time.”16  
While the suit was pending, Act 312 was passed and one of the 
defendants filed a motion to enforce the stay provision of the 
Act.17 M.J. Farms opposed the stay on two grounds: (1) the Act 
was inapplicable to its claims because Act 312 only amended Title 
30 of Louisiana’s Revised Statutes, and not Title 31,18 and (2) the 
Act violated the Louisiana State Constitution by depriving the 
plaintiffs of vested rights in their causes of action.19 After the 
Louisiana Attorney General submitted a memorandum urging the 
constitutionality of Act 312, the district court ruled, without 
elaboration, that Act 312 was unconstitutional under both the 
Louisiana and United States Constitutions.  
Following various procedural entanglements20 the matter was 
considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which found that Act 
                                                                                                             
 14. M.J. Farms, Ltd. V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07–2371, p. 1–3 (La. 7/1/08); 
998 So. 2d 16, 20–21. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at p. 2–3, 998 So. 2d at 21. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 5, 998 So. 2d at 22. 
 19. Id. at 20, 998 So. 2d at 31. 
 20. In April 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s 
first judgment, holding that Act 312 was unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal 
of the ruling, and remanded the case on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to 
properly raise its constitutional argument in a formal pleading. M.J. Farms, Ltd. 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-0450 (La. 4/27/07); 956 So. 2d 573, 573. Following 
that ruling, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Strike and/or for 
Declaratory Judgment Declaring Act 312 of 2006 Unconstitutional and 
Inapplicable to the Instant Act in the state district court. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., Docket No. 24055 “A”, 7th Judicial District Court, Parish 
of Catahoula, Louisiana. Defendants then removed the case to federal court on 
the basis that the plaintiff’s federal constitutional challenge to Act 312 conferred 
federal question jurisdiction over the case. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 2007 WL 2081008, at *1 (W.D. La. 2007). The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Louisiana, however, remanded the proceedings 
back to the state court, where the trial judge again ruled without elaboration that 
Act 312 was unconstitutional. Id. at *2; M.J. Farms, Ltd., Docket No. 24055 
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312 was constitutional.21 The Court rejected M.J. Farms’ argument 
that the retroactive application of the Act violated due process.22 
The retroactive application of the Act did not alter the parties’ 
substantive rights or divest M.J. Farms of its causes of action; it 
only changed the remedy available to plaintiffs.23 Plaintiffs have 
no substantive, constitutionally protected right to recover money 
damages in lieu of a defendant’s specific performance of its 
remediation obligations.24  
The Court also noted two important policy concerns that are 
furthered by the retroactive application of Act 312: (1) the 
protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the public by 
ensuring that environmental damage will actually be remediated; 
and (2) providing real substance to the expertise of the Louisiana 
Office of Conservation (“LOC”) and the LDNR regarding oilfield 
remediation.25 Act 312 does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of 
the district court over civil matters in violation of Article V, 
Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution.26 The district court’s 
jurisdiction over all civil matters is original, but not exclusive.27 
Act 312 instructs the district court to refer the matter to the 
LOC/LDNR upon a finding that that environmental damage indeed 
exists and identifying the responsible party, which does not offend 
Article V, section sixteen.28 
2. Prescription—Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc. 
Plaintiffs alleged contamination from underground gasoline 
storage tanks at a nearby gas station.29 The tanks had been replaced 
in 1997 after the discovery of leaks.30 In 2001 and 2002, the LDEQ 
sent letters to plaintiffs informing them of environmental 
contamination in the vicinity and that there was a possibility that 
                                                                                                             
 
“A”. As before, Judge Johnson did not elaborate on the reasoning behind her 
ruling. Defendants appealed this second ruling by the district court. Because the 
judgment found a statute unconstitutional, the appeal was heard by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. See LA CONST. art. 5, § 5(d). 
 21. M.J. Farms, Ltd. V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07–2371, p. 32 (La. 7/1/08); 
998 So. 2d 16, 38. 
 22. Id. at 36, 998 So. 2d at 29. 
 23. Id. at 37–38, 998 So. 2d at 31–32.  
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 39 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 26. M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 36–37. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 37. 
 29. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So. 3d 991, 995. 
 30. Id.  
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gasoline had migrated or would migrate in the future onto 
plaintiffs’ property.31 The letters also revealed the presence of 
chemicals associated with gasoline in the area, and an attached 
map established that tests were conducted on the plaintiffs’ 
property.32 The LDEQ recommended that the landowners limit the 
amount of time they spent in the noted areas and disclosed that it 
was in the process of finalizing a contract for the remediation.33  
In 2007, plaintiffs filed suit against the neighboring landowner, 
the gas station operator, and Chevron seeking damages for 
diminution of value of the property.34 Defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment claiming that plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed 
one year after plaintiffs acquired, or should have acquired, 
knowledge of the contamination and damage to their property from 
the letters in 2001 and 2002.35 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
accepted review of the district court’s denial of these motions.36 
The applicable prescriptive period for tortious conduct causing 
damage to immovable property is one year, which runs from the 
day the property owner had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the damage.37 Constructive knowledge is notice that is enough to 
excite attention and put the injured party on guard, and whether it 
exists depends on the reasonableness of the injured party’s action 
or inaction in light of the surrounding circumstances.38 
Plaintiffs argued that it was reasonable for them to wait for 
further notice from the LDEQ rather than to file suit in 2002 
because the letters did not provide definitive evidence of 
contamination, did not state whether the contamination exceeded 
acceptable limits, and indicated that the investigation was 
ongoing.39 The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument. 
The Court found that the letters clearly indicated the presence of 
damage in the form of undesirable levels of contaminates on the 
property and noted the disclosure that a remediation contract was 
being finalized, which was a clear indication that matters had 
advanced beyond mere investigation.40 While the letters did not 
specifically inform plaintiffs that the soil and groundwater on their 
property was contaminated, it was “beyond peradventure” that they 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 995. 
 35. Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 995–96. 
 36. Id. at 996. 
 37. Id. at 997. 
 38. Id. at 997–98. 
 39. Id. at 1000. 
 40. Id. at 1001. 
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provided sufficient information to excite attention and put 
plaintiffs on notice that they had a reasonable basis to pursue a 
claim.41 Waiting more than five years to file suit was unreasonable, 
and the plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed.42  
This decision sends a message to landowners that they have a 
burden to investigate possible claims when they receive 
information that their property might be contaminated. 
Landowners who ignore signs of contamination and then claim that 
they waited to file suit until they knew the extent of the damage or 
had definitive evidence of damage will face a challenge in 
successfully defeating an exception of prescription.  
3. Prescription and Scope of Remediation—Marin v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp. 
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. involved two pieces of property—
the “Marin Property” and the “Breaux Property”—in St. Mary 
Parish upon which Exxon or its predecessors (collectively, 
“Exxon”) conducted oil and gas exploration, production, and 
transportation activities.43 Both the Marin and the Breaux 
properties had also been used for sugarcane cultivation.44 Pursuant 
to leases on the properties dating back to the 1930s, Exxon 
installed and operated oil and gas facilities on the properties, and, 
as was industry custom at the time, Exxon used unlined pits to 
dispose of the byproducts of its oil and gas operations.45 The water 
produced in the pits was discharged into a nearby waterway.46  
By the 1980s, plaintiffs were concerned about sugarcane 
growth in the areas around the pits.47 Between 1988 and 1990, they 
made numerous demands upon Exxon to clean up the property so 
they could continue to grow sugarcane.48 Around that time, in 
1986, the LDNR amended Statewide Order 29-B49 to require the 
registration and closure of existing unlined oil pits and the 
remediation of various contaminates to certain standards.50 
                                                                                                             
 41. Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 1001.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10) ; 48 So. 3d 234, 
239. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 240. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 240. 
 49. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101-641 (1987). 
 50. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d 234, 
240. 
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Between 1987 and 1991, Exxon closed all of the remaining pits on 
plaintiffs’ properties and “represented that it was remediating the 
pit areas to Statewide Order 29-B standards.”51  
After the Corbello decision, plaintiffs hired an environmental 
expert to test the properties, and the expert reported that there was 
significant contamination present.52 In November 2003, plaintiffs 
filed suit against Exxon asserting claims sounding in tort and 
contract “for remediation of the soil and groundwater and other 
damages arising out of Exxon’s activities.”53 The trial court found 
that Exxon’s deposit of chemicals on plaintiffs’ properties 
constituted negligent operations by Exxon, resulting in breach of 
contract and negligence.54 The trial court rejected Exxon’s 
arguments that the plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed and found that 
contra non valentem suspended the running of prescription until 
the expert reports were received in 2003.55 The Court of Appeal 
affirmed.56 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ 
applications of both Exxon and plaintiffs to address several 
assignments of error.57 
a. Prescription 
Contra non valentem,58 which applies only in exceptional 
circumstances, suspends the running of prescription where the 
cause of action is neither known nor reasonably knowable by the 
plaintiff, even though plaintiff’s ignorance is not induced by the 
defendant.59 Knowledge sufficient to start the running of 
prescription is information, which, if pursued, will lead to the true 
condition of things, considering the reasonableness of the 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 240–41. 
 53. Id. at 241. 
 54. Id. at 242. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 243. 
 57. Id. at 244. 
 58. As a defense to prescription, plaintiffs often assert the theory of contra 
non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, which literally means “no 
prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action.” Edmundson v. 
Amoco Prod. Co., 924 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1991). Contra non valentum 
operates as an exceptional remedy to the general rule of prescription and must 
be strictly construed. Ellender v. Goldking Prod. Co., 99-0069, p. 8 (La. App. 1 
Cir. 6/23/00); 775 So. 2d 11, 17. The doctrine focuses on factors outside of the 
plaintiff’s control that prevent the plaintiff from bringing an action. Edmundson, 
924 F.2d at 82.  
 59. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245. Contra non valentem also suspends the running 
of prescription in other situations, which are not relevant for the purposes of this 
Article and are not discussed here.  
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plaintiff’s action in light of his education, intelligence, and the 
nature of the defendant’s conduct. 
The court outlined plaintiffs’ knowledge and found that contra 
non valentem did not suspend the running of prescription on 
plaintiffs’ claims. By the late 1980s, plaintiffs knew that sugarcane 
would not grow in areas surrounding the pits and that Exxon had 
been dumping in the pits for years.60 They had made multiple 
requests that contamination be removed from the area.61 Between 
1987 and 1991, they knew that Exxon was closing the pits and that 
sludge remained in the pit bottoms.62 Post-1991, plaintiffs knew 
that healthy sugarcane crop was still not growing in the area.63 The 
Court also noted that no new damage became apparent after 
1991.64 
The Court acknowledged that a “layperson could not have 
discovered the contamination on the property without the 
assistance of an expert.” The Court then looked to the Hogg 
constructive knowledge analysis to determine whether the failure 
to grow sugarcane should have alerted the plaintiffs of potential 
contamination and prompted them to seek out an expert.65 While 
the information in the letters in Hogg was far more detailed than 
the information plaintiffs here had, the sugarcane damage was an 
“outward sign of ‘actual and appreciable damage’ that was 
sufficient to excite attention and put the plaintiffs on guard.”66 
Plaintiffs knew that healthy sugarcane should have grown within 
four years of the 1991 planting.67 As a result, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court found that plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge at 
least by 1995.68 The fact that an expert may be needed to 
determine the extent of damage in an oilfield contamination case 
does not prolong the prescriptive period until an expert is actually 
hired.69 It was unreasonable for plaintiffs to wait until 2003 to hire 
an expert and file suit, and by that time, their claims had 
prescribed.70 This decision takes plaintiffs’ burden to investigate 
potential claims for property damage even further than the Court in 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. at 248. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 247. 
 63. Id. at 248. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 249. 
 66. Id. at 249–50. 
 67. Id. at 251. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
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Hogg by indicating that there is a duty to investigate triggered by 
even more abstract knowledge of contamination. 
b. Scope of Remediation 
Plaintiffs argued that Exxon should be liable for restoring the 
property to its original pre-lease condition based on (1) the lease 
provisions; and (2) the rule delineated in Terrebonne Parish 
School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc.71 arguing that Castex 
recognized an implied duty of restoration to the property’s original 
condition. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected both of these 
arguments. The original 1941 lease contained no restoration 
provisions.72 In 1994, the parties executed a novation of the 1941 
lease that required the lessee to “restore the leased premises as near 
as reasonably practicable to its present condition.”73 Because the 
1994 novation of the lease extinguished the 1941 lease, the Court 
found that the term “present condition” in the novation could not 
relate back to the 1941 lease.74 Accordingly, the Court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that the lease provisions required restoration to 
the original 1941 condition. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court then addressed plaintiffs’ 
argument based on the rule in Castex. In Castex, the Court held 
that “in the absence of an express lease provision, Mineral Code 
article 122 does not impose an implied duty to restore the surface 
to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has 
exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively.”75 
Plaintiffs argued that this rule applied because Exxon exercised its 
rights under the lease unreasonably and excessively.76 The Court 
distinguished Castex because Castex addressed whether restoration 
was necessary at all, whereas here the issue is the extent of 
restoration.77 The obligation to correct the damage due to 
unreasonable or excessive operations does not necessarily mean 
that the lessee has a duty to restore the land to its pre-lease 
condition.78 Here, the Court acknowledged that Exxon operated 
unreasonably or excessively, but found that its additional 
restoration duty was the duty to correct the consequences of 
                                                                                                             
 71. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 04-0968 (La. 
1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 789. 
 72. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 257. 
 73. Id. at 258. 
 74. Id. at 258–59. 
 75. Id. at 257. 
 76. Id. at 259. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 260. 
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unreasonable or excessive use, not to restore the property to its 
original condition.79 
4. Subsequent Purchaser—Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. 
Amerada Hess Corp. 
In Eagle Pipe, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined what is 
commonly known as the “subsequent purchaser doctrine.”80 The 
subsequent purchaser doctrine provides that “an owner of property 
has no right or actual interest in recovering from a third party for 
damage which was inflicted on the property before his purchase, in 
the absence of an assignment or subrogation of the rights 
belonging to the owner of the property when the damage was 
inflicted.”81  
Plaintiff, Eagle Pipe, purchased property in Lafayette Parish in 
1988.82 From 1981 until 1988, the previous owners leased the 
property to Union Pipe, a company that operated the property as a 
pipe yard where it bought, stored, and sold used oilfield tubing.83 
After Eagle Pipe purchased the property, the Louisiana Department 
of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”), following-up on an alleged 
field interview, found that the property was contaminated with 
Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive 
Materials (“TENORM”).84 The LDEQ cited Eagle Pipe for 
violating TENORM exposure regulations and ordered that the 
property be remediated.85 
Eagle Pipe then filed suit against several groups of defendants 
which it alleged caused the contamination, including the previous 
owners and various companies that sold or transported the 
TENORM contaminated pipe to the property.86 The defendants 
urged the exception of no right of action, arguing that Eagle Pipe 
had no right to assert a claim for damage to the property which 
occurred before Eagle Pipe was its owner.87 The trial court granted 
the exception.88 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. 
 80. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267 (La. 
10/25/11); 79 So. 3d 246. While this decision relates to the contamination of a 
pipe-cleaning yard, its analysis extends to cases subject to Act 312 involving oil 
and gas exploration and production sites. 
 81. Id. at 256–57. 
 82. Id. at 253. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 254. 
 85. Id.   
 86. Eagle Pipe, 79 So. 3d at 254.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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originally affirmed the trial court’s decision; however, on 
rehearing the Fourth Circuit vacated its previous judgment and 
reversed the trial court’s ruling.89 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
granted writs to determine the bounds of the subsequent purchaser 
rule.  
Within its plea to both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, Eagle Pipe attempted to carve out an 
exception to the subsequent purchaser rule in an attempt to 
circumvent its application when the prior damage to property was 
not overt or apparent at the time of the sale.90 Eagle Pipe argued 
that the contamination on its property was not apparent at the time 
of its purchase, and, therefore, the subsequent purchaser rule 
should not apply to preclude it from seeking damages against the 
entities alleged to have caused the contamination.91 
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument and held 
that the subsequent purchaser rule applies regardless of whether 
the damage was apparent at the time of the sale.92 Significantly, 
when there is apparent damage to the property, the law does not 
allow a subsequent purchaser to profit by permitting it to negotiate 
a lower purchase price based on the condition of the property and 
have a separate right to seek damages from the tortfeasor who is 
responsible for the property’s poor condition.93 And when the 
damage is not apparent, the law only provides the subsequent 
purchaser “with the right to seek rescission of the sale, or a 
reduction in the purchase price,” but not the right to also sue for 
damages against the tortfeasor.94 In either instance, “the personal 
nature of the right of the landowner at that time does not change, 
and remains with the landowner unless the right is explicitly 
assigned or subrogated to another.”95 
Under the subsequent purchaser rule as articulated in Eagle 
Pipe, absent an explicit assignment or subrogation of the previous 
owner’s rights, landowners may not recover in tort for property 
damages incurred before they acquired the land, even when the 
damages are not apparent. While this Louisiana Supreme Court 
decision certainly has not eliminated all legacy lawsuits based 
upon historic contamination to property, in many instances it 
significantly limits the scope of such lawsuits and the claims of 
current landowners.  
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. at 254–55. 
 90. Id. at 257. 
 91. Id. at 257 
 92. Eagle Pipe, 79 So. 3d at 275. 
 93. Id. at 276. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
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B. Other Issues in Act 312 Cases 
Several other significant issues arising in Act 312 cases have 
been addressed by other courts, including the Louisiana courts of 
appeal and federal district courts, while many of the major issues 
have been fought in the district courts with varying results. Some 
of these issues and court decisions are discussed below.  
1. One Trial or Two? 
There has been some question about whether Act 312 allows 
for a preliminary hearing to first determine whether environmental 
damage exists and identify a responsible party, or whether this 
should be determined at a full-blown trial (usually by a jury) along 
with the landowners’ private claims. Though courts have 
recognized that the Act is ambiguous on this point, courts have 
generally sided with plaintiffs, arguing that there should be one 
trial to determine all issues.96 While this result avoids piecemeal 
litigation and the potential for inconsistent judgments, it also 
delays both the formulation of a remediation plan and the 
remediation itself.  
2. What are the Appropriate Regulatory Standards for 
Remediation? 
For the past quarter-century, the Office of Conservation has 
followed the standards under its Statewide Order No. 29-B.97 
These standards involve various limits for various substances 
(chlorides, heavy metals, etc.) in different environments (uplands, 
wetlands, etc.).98 LDEQ, on the other hand, created its Risk 
Evaluation/Corrective Action Program (“RECAP”) document, 
which uses risk-based standards similar to those formulated by the 
                                                                                                             
 96. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 954, 
958 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that the statute can be read two ways and adopting 
the interpretation set forth in Duplantier Family Partnership v. BP Amoco that a 
single trial, rather than separate trials, is proper. 07-0293 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2007), 
955 So. 2d 763); Duplantier Family P'ship v. BP Amoco, 07-0293 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 2007), 955 So. 2d 763 (unpublished opinion) (noting that bifurcated trials 
require the consent of all parties under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
and finding that Act 312 does not mandate two trials and that having one trial 
promotes judicial efficiency). 
 97. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101–641 (1987). 
 98. See id.  
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Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).99 In 2010, the Office 
of Conservation proposed its own risk-based documents, the Site 
Evaluation and Remediation Procedures Manual (“SERP 
Manual”), and came very close to adopting it before deciding not 
to do so (or at least ceasing all effort), leaving the matter somewhat 
unsettled.100  
3. What are the Means by which a Landowner may Obtain 
Damages in Addition to the Remediation to Regulatory 
Standards Required by Act 312? 
Plaintiff attorneys have promoted a number of theories to 
support damages over the amount required to remediate the 
property to regulatory standards. Damages have been sought for 
storage of hazardous materials, trespass, and stigma resulting in 
diminution of property value.101 Plaintiffs have also asserted 
entitlement to damages for the cost of remediation beyond any 
required regulatory remediation.102 The likelihood of success based 
on these theories has not been resolved, but their potential for 
success creates settlement value.  
4. May a Defendant Admit Responsibility for Remediation 
without Admitting Liability on the Landowners’ Claims for 
Additional Damages? 
On its face, Act 312 seems to allow defendants to admit 
responsibility for remediation without admitting liability for 
additional damages.103 But because plaintiffs have generally 
                                                                                                             
 99. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, §§ 1301–1309 (2012); Risk Evaluation/ 
Corrective Action Program (RECAP), LA. DEP’T OF EVNTL. QUALITY (2003), 
available at http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/DIVISIONS/Underground 
StorageTankandRemediationDivision/RemediationServices/RECAP/RECAPDocu
ment2003.aspx.  
 100. La. Office of Conservation, Notice of Intent, 2010 La. Reg. Text 
211335. 
 101. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d 
234; see also Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So. 3d 991; 
see also Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98–2326, p. 13 (La. 6/29/99); 737 
So. 2d 720, 731. 
 102. See State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 10-1341 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
2/1/12); 85 So. 3d 158, cert granted 12-0884 (La. 6/15/12); 92 So. 3d 340 
(addressing whether Act 312 limits the recoverable remediation damage to the 
cost of the feasible plan identified by the LDEQ).  
 103. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 954, 
958 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that the statute can be read to allow the issue of 
damages to be tried separately from the issue of liability for remediation).  
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convinced judges to rule that admission of responsibility for 
environmental damage requires admission of civil liability for 
private damage claims, defendants have been reluctant to admit 
responsibility.104 As a result, remediating the property before trial 
has been unlikely as a practical matter. This is a victory for the 
plaintiff lawyers and can ultimately delay remediation for years. 
5. Does Act 312 Apply in Federal Court? 
Cases that would be subject to Act 312 have been before 
federal courts on several occasions.105 Plaintiffs have argued that 
the Burford abstention doctrine106 warrants the federal court’s 
abstention based on Louisiana’s Act 312.107 Some federal courts 
have rejected these arguments and refused to abstain under 
Burford.108 While federal courts have exercised jurisdiction over 
cases that would be subject to Act 312, there is still some question 
about whether Act 312 should apply in federal court. It is a long 
recognized principle that federal courts sitting in diversity apply 
state substantive law and federal procedural law.109 But this has 
not stopped at least one federal court from interpreting and 
applying Act 312—a law recognized both by that court and by 
Louisiana courts as a procedural law.110  
                                                                                                             
 104. See, e.g., Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. v. Chevron, 07-927 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
5/21/08); 984 So. 2d 223, 229; Germany v. Conoco Phillips Co., 07-1145 (La. 
App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08); 980 So. 2d 101, 103–04; see also Savoie v. Richard., 
Docket No. 10-18078, 38th Judicial District Court, Cameron Parish, Louisiana. 
 105. See Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-01100, 
2011 WL 3878329 (W.D. La. Sept. 1, 2011); C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. 
of Cal., No. 09-2762, 2009 WL 2765814 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009); Brownell 
Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 958. 
 106. The Burford abstention doctrine provides that federal courts should not 
interfere with proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies when (1) 
there are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then 
at bar;” or (2) the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in 
similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009 
WL 2765814 at *7 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City 
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)). 
 107. C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009 WL 2765814 at *4; Brownell Land Co., 538 F. 
Supp. 2d at 958. 
 108. C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009 WL 2765814 at *4; Brownell Land Co., 538 F. 
Supp. 2d at 959. 
 109. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (citing 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1939)). 
 110. See Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 957–58 (noting that “[t]he 
Act is clearly a procedural law” and then determining whether the Act requires a 
separate determination of liability and damages); M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon 
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In Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., the defendant filed a 
motion in limine essentially seeking to have the issues of liability 
and damages tried separately.111 In ruling on the defendant’s 
motion, the Court stated that Act 312 was “clearly a procedural 
law,” and then went on to analyze Act 312 and even cited to a 
Louisiana case that relied on the Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure in deciding the same issue.112 Admittedly, determining 
the proper law to apply in diversity cases is often difficult and 
requires consideration of complex issues.113 But there is at least a 
valid argument that Act 312 is a procedural law that should not be 
applied in federal diversity cases.  
C. The Practical Dynamics of Act 312 Litigation. 
In practice, many of the issues discussed above do not get 
resolved by the courts, because these legacy cases tend to settle 
before trial. Generally, plaintiffs’ experts will assert that the 
appropriate remediation will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Defense experts usually have a less sensational assessment of the 
need for and extent of remediation. The competing expert 
assessments drive the vast majority of cases to settlement, with the 
landowners typically accepting some money (often a large amount, 
but a modest percentage of their experts’ damage estimate) in 
exchange for the agreement to stop urging a remediation plan 
costing hundreds of millions of dollars and to allow the defendants 
to remediate the property according to the regulatory standards 
acceptable to the Office of Conservation. 
During the 2011 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, 
the oil and gas industry supported S.B. 146 by Senator Adley and 
the duplicate H.B. 563 by Representative Cortez. The original bills 
were short “placeholder” bills intended to be amended as they went 
through the legislative process. Extensive amendments were 
circulated shortly before a House Natural Resources Committee 
hearing on HB 563, and, subsequently, the bill was involuntarily 
deferred in committee, effectively killing the legislation for the 
                                                                                                             
 
Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So. 2d 16 (“We find it clear Act 312 
attaches a procedure ‘for judicial resolution of claims for environmental 
damage’”) (quoting LA. REV. STAT.  ANN. § 30:29 (West 2008)). 
 111. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 955, 958. 
 112. Id. at 957–58. 
 113. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. 
Ct. 1431 (2010); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (referring to the Erie analysis as a 
“challenging endeavor”). 
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session.114 Consequently, the Legislature requested that the 
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources study the matter and 
report its findings.115  
That report was published on February 1, 2012.116 The report, 
prepared by J. Blake Canfield, Senior Attorney in the Louisiana 
Office of Conservation, thoroughly recounted the history of Act 
312 and set the stage for a legislative battle in 2012.117 The report 
stated, among other things, that of the 271 legacy lawsuits subject 
to Act 312, 60 did not provide a specific site description, and only 
61 were supported by testing data submitted to the LDNR (as 
required by the law).118 Only two of those had been identified by 
the Office of Conservation to have long-term risk.119 As of the 
publication of the report, only one case had gone through a 
complete hearing process at the Office of Conservation, and no 
plans had been adopted or implemented by any court pursuant to 
Act 312.120  
In addition, 64 cases settled. Twenty-nine of these settlements 
were made without the Office of Conservation receiving 
environmental data.121 Of the remaining 35 cases, 32 had 
environmental data showing no need to remediate to achieve 
regulatory standards.122 Only three of the 64 settled cases required 
remediation.123 The subject properties in those three cases were 
remediated.124  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 114. History of H.B. 563, Reg. Sess. (La. 2011), available at http://www. 
legis.state.la.us (follow “Session Info” hyperlink; then follow “2011 Regular 
Legislative Session.; then search for “HB 563”; then click on “History” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).  
 115. H.C.R. 167, Reg. Sess. (La. 2011). 
 116. J. Blake Canfield, Senior Attorney, La. Office of Conservation, Report 
to the House Committee on Natural Resources and Environment and Senate 
Committee on Natural Resources as Requested in House Concurrent Resolution 
167, 2011 Legislative Session, February 1, 2012, available at http://www.scribd. 
com/doc/82935877/DNR-Report-to-House-and-Senate-NR (transmitted under 
cover of letter dated February 1, 2012 by Scott A. Angelle, Secretary, La. Dept. 
of Natural Resources). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 17–18. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. at 20–21. 
 121. Canfield, supra note 116, at 21–22. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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IV. THE 2012 AMENDMENTS TO LEGACY LEGISLATION 
The Office of Conservation’s report provided the backdrop for 
the exhausting and controversial process of re-assessing Act 312 
during the 2012 regular legislative session.125 
A. The Proposals 
At least twenty-three bills relating to legacy litigation, some of 
which were duplicates, were filed in the 2012 Regular Session.126 
Generally, these bills fell into three groups.  
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. 
 126. These bills included: S.B. 731, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Allain) 
(provides relative to remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production 
sites), substitute adopted, S.B. 760, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Allain) 
(provides relative to qualified admission of responsibility for remediation of 
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 555, Reg. Sess. (La. 
2012) (Sen. Adley) (provides for the remediation of oilfield sites and exploration 
and production sites); S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Long) (provides for 
remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 443, 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Morrell) (provides relative to limited admission of 
liability in lawsuits for environmental damages); S.B. 240, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) 
(Sen. Murray) (provides relative to certain mineral lease indemnification 
agreements); H.B. 1180, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides for 
remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); H.B. 1037, 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for the Louisiana Land 
Owners Protection Act); H.B. 920, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Johnson) 
(provide exemplary damages for environmental damages); H.B. 897, Reg. Sess. 
(La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides with respect to remediation of oil fields); 
H.B. 863, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for lessee’s 
obligation to restore the leased premises); H.B. 862, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. 
Lambert) (provides with respect to civil actions for environmental damages); 
H.B. 853, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Montoucet) (provides for the Louisiana Land 
Owners Protection Act); H.B. 678, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Jim Morris) (provides 
for the restoration of certain oilfields); H.B. 642, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. 
Montoucet) (provides for the remediation of certain oilfield sites); H.B. 618, 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to the admission of 
liability for environmental damage); H.B. 649, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Jim 
Morris) (provides for the remediation of certain oilfield sites); H.B. 482, Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for discovery in cases involving 
certain environmental damage from oilfield operations); H.B. 463, Reg. Sess. 
(La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to pleading and discovery in 
certain civil actions); H.B. 460, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) 
(provides civil procedures for the remediation of oilfield sites); H.B. 458, Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides for notice of breach of a mineral 
lease); H.B. 454, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to 
bifurcation of trials); H.B. 388, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Johnson) (provides 
indemnification for environmental damages to an oilfield site); H.B. 235, Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides relative to mineral lease 
indemnification agreements). 
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First, the bills by Senator Morrell and Representative 
Abramson were supported by the Louisiana Oil and Gas 
Association (“LOGA”). After considering several issues that it 
would like addressed, LOGA concentrated on one narrow, but 
important change—allowing a defendant to admit responsibility 
for the purpose of conducting a cleanup (and thus clear the way to 
move forward with remediation) without admitting liability on the 
landowner’s claims for additional damages.127 The language of Act 
312 seems to permit this, but plaintiffs have generally convinced 
judges to rule the other way.128 This makes it difficult to get the 
property remediated before trial, allowing the remediation to be 
delayed for years. The practical difficulty of defendants to 
remediate without admitting liability puts plaintiffs in a favorable 
posture before the jury. Under such a regime, plaintiffs could argue 
before the jury that the property has not been cleaned up— a point 
that was considered by many to be quite effective. 
Other bills by Representatives Montoucet, Johnson, and 
Lambert were supported by an alliance of some of the main law 
firms representing the landowner-plaintiffs in legacy lawsuits. 
Predictably, these bills promoted positions that strongly favored 
the landowners’ actions against parties conducting oil and gas 
exploration and production activities on their properties. Some 
bills proposed voiding existing contracts by retroactively 
prohibiting certain indemnity agreements in purchase and sale 
agreements, and others would reverse rulings of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court by allowing a current landowner to sue for 
damages occurring before that landowner owned the property.129 
Finally, a third group of bills introduced by Senator Alain, 
Senator Long, and Representative Harrison was promoted by 
Jimmy Faircloth, former executive counsel to Governor Bobby 
Jindal and now attorney to Roy O. Martin Lumber Company, a 
large landowner. While Mr. Faircloth initially characterized his bill 
as a “compromise,” his proposal contained several elements that 
were not supported by LOGA.130 While Mr. Faircloth accepted 
                                                                                                             
 127. Testimony by Gifford Briggs and Loulan Pitre, Jr. at Hearing of the 
House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, April 17, 2012. 
 128. See supra Part II(B). 
 129. See, e.g., H.B. 388, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (prohibiting indemnification 
for environmental damage to an oilfield site); H.B. 862, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) 
(provides with respect to environmental damages). 
 130. S.B. 731, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides relative to remediation of 
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 
2012) (provides for remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production 
sites); H.B. 1180, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for remediation of oilfield sits 
and exploration and production sites). 
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that a defendant should be able to admit responsibility for a 
cleanup without admitting liability on the landowners’ claims for 
additional damages, he proposed that the admission and 
remediation plan adopted as a consequence not be admissible in 
evidence at trial unless the State has formally intervened in the 
litigation. Given that the State has thus far intervened in only 19 of 
271 cases, as a practical matter this would keep the jury from 
knowing the remediation plan recommended by the Office of 
Conservation and would facilitate the landowners’ arguments for 
excessive remediation plans.  
B. The Legislative Compromise 
The outcome of the legislation remained uncertain until May 
16, 2012, when a compromise package was announced131 and was 
ultimately enacted into law, becoming effective on August 1, 
2012. 132 The compromise package enacts articles 1552 and 1563 
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and amends and reenacts 
portions of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29.133 The 
package does not apply to cases in which an order setting the case 
for trial was entered on or before May 15, 2012 (even if that trial is 
later continued), and it specifically provides that the LDNR does 
not maintain primary jurisdiction.134 
The key provisions proposed by the oil and gas industry are 
contained within the package. Most of the compromise package 
addresses admissions of responsibility for environmental damage 
and their consequences.135 However, the package also creates two 
other very novel procedures: the option for a preliminary hearing 
that could result in parties obtaining a preliminary (but perhaps 
tenuous) dismissal without prejudice, and a one-year suspension of 
                                                                                                             
 131. Capitol News Bureau, Legislative Briefs for May 17, 2012, THE 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 17, 2012, available at http://theadvocate.com/ 
home/2849235-125/legislative-briefs. 
 132. The compromise consisted of Act No. 754 (House Bill 618) and Act No. 
779 (Senate Bill 555). H.B. 618, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for a 
preference for services by companies domiciled in Louisiana relative to a public 
bid process); S.B. 555, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for remediation of 
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites). 
 133. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE OF CIV. PROC. arts. 1552, 1563); 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 
555) (West) (enacting portions of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29). 
 134. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE OF CIV. PROC. arts. 1552, 1563). 
 135. Id. 
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prescription established when plaintiffs file a “notice of intent to 
investigate.”136 
1. Key Components of the Provisions Dealing with Limited 
Admissions and Their Consequences 
a. Limited Admissions of Responsibility 
A party admitting liability under Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 30:29 may make a “limited admission,” i.e., limit the 
admission to responsibility for a remediation to applicable 
regulatory standards.137 In other words, the admitting party need 
not waive defenses to private claims for additional damages. After 
a limited admission, the court shall make a timely referral to the 
Office of Conservation to conduct a public hearing to approve or 
structure a remediation to regulatory standards.138  
b. Admissibility of Plan and Proceedings 
The limited admission, the plan approved by the Office of 
Conservation, and written agency comments shall be admissible 
evidence at trial.139 Parties may subpoena agency personnel 
involved in formulation of the remediation plan after the 
remediation plan is submitted to the court, subject to payment of 
subpoena response costs.140  
c. Environmental Management Orders 
The court must enter an environmental management order to 
facilitate investigation and environmental testing upon request of 
any party or the Officer of Conservation in any case subject to 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29. The order shall address 
                                                                                                             
 136. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting portions 
OF LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29). 
 137. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(1)–(2) (West) (Titled “Limited admissions of 
liability in environmental damage lawsuits; effect”)). 
 138. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (amending LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) (West)). 
 139. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(3) (West)). 
 140. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(5) (West)). 
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access, sampling and testing protocols, and provide specific time 
frames for testing and sampling.141 
d. Deadline for Limited Admissions 
If one party makes a limited admission, the other parties must 
file any limited admissions within 60 days. However, all limited 
admissions must be made within 90 days of the completion of 
environmental testing in accordance with the environmental 
management order set by the court.142  
e. Procedure for Formulation of the Remediation Plan 
The formulation of remediation plans after an admission of 
responsibility is limited to one time per case.143 Ex parte 
communication with agency personnel is prohibited while a 
remediation plan is being formulated.144 Comment by the 
Department of Agricultural and Forestry, the Department of 
Environmental Quality, and the Department of Natural Resources 
will be allowed if the Office of Conservation preliminarily 
approves a remediation plan that applies the regulatory standards 
of that agency or provides an exception from the Office of 
Conservation's standards.145 The Office of Conservation and the 
court are empowered to facilitate implementation of a plan once 
adopted, including the ability to require the cooperation of the 
current operator.146  
f. Responsibility for Certain Costs 
A party admitting responsibility shall be required to deposit 
funds to cover the Office of Conservation’s costs with an initial 
deposit of $100,000. The party admitting responsibility shall also 
reimburse the plaintiffs’ costs as provided by Louisiana Revised 
                                                                                                             
 141. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1552 (West)). 
 142. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(4)–(5) (West)). 
 143. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (amending LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(2) (West)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(3) (West 2007)).  
 146. Id. 
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Statutes section 30:29(E)(1) in an amount determined by the 
court.147 
g. Waiver of Punitive Damages 
A party admitting responsibility for environmental damage 
waives any right to claim indemnity for punitive damages.148  
2. Novel Procedural Changes 
a. Preliminary Hearing and Dismissal Without Prejudice 
Defendants may request a preliminary hearing, at which 
affidavits and written evidence will be allowed, to determine 
whether good cause exists for maintaining the defendant as a party 
in the litigation. Successful defendants will be dismissed without 
prejudice, subject to being brought back in upon discovery of 
evidence not reasonably available at the time of the preliminary 
dismissal. A defendant obtaining a preliminary dismissal will be 
entitled to a dismissal with prejudice following a final non-
appealable judgment in the case.149  
b. Notice of Intent to Investigate and Suspension of Prescription 
Plaintiffs may suspend prescription for up to one year by filing 
a notice of intent to investigate, which must identify the property, 
the alleged environmental damage, all known owners of the 
property, and the current operator. Subsequent lawsuits must 
include all environmental testing results.150  
V. CONCLUSION 
Act 312 of 2006 created Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:29 in the hope of bringing more rationality and consistency to 
legacy litigation alleging environmental damage arising from oil 
and gas exploration and production operations. In practice, Act 312 
created new legal issues for parties and their lawyers to litigate, 
and little remediation of contaminated properties has actually been 
                                                                                                             
 147. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA. 
CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(6) (West)). 
 148. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(L)). 
 149. Id. (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29(B)(6) (West)). 
 150. Id. (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29(B)(7) (West)). 
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achieved. In 2012, the Louisiana legislature re-visited the issue and 
enacted the first amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:29 and new related provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure. The expressed goal of these amendments is to facilitate 
expedited remediation of actual contamination as may be necessary 
to protect the public safety. Doubtlessly, lawyers for both 
landowners and industry will once again argue over how these new 
provisions will be interpreted and applied. Only time will tell the 
result. 
 
